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Contesting Corporate Control in the U.S.: 
The Role of Ownership Structure and Antitakeover measure 
 
  
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates the role of ownership structure and antitakeover 
measure in proxy contests using nested logit model. Findings indicate that 
dissidents target small firms with high agency costs, poor performance, and 
a high volume of prior shareholder proposals for Media Threats. Following 
a Media Threat, dissidents target firms with more independent boards, with 
the next step being a SEC filing of a proxy fight. After that, management in 
firms with poison pills and less independent boards are more likely to settle 
contests with dissidents, while firms with lower insider ownership are more 
likely to go through a proxy fight. 
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1.  Introduction 
It has been argued that the U.S. corporate voting process imposes substantial costs on 
shareholders seeking to contest board seats. Indeed, Pound (1988) and Bebchuk (2005) contend 
that due to the costs of mounting an activist campaign, activist investors are largely constrained 
from running for corporate boards. Furthermore, if a proxy fight does occur, incumbent 
management is in an advantageous position relative to activist investors since antitakeover 
measure imposes substantial barriers to obtaining control of the board. Additionally, 
management can use corporate resources to defend against external threats.  
Increased concern about the ability of activists to contest board seats has led to calls for the 
reform of relevant corporate laws to empower shareholders (e.g., Bebchuk, 2005). On June 10, 
2009, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a rule that fundamentally would 
reform the current proxy process to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. The 
proposed rules would add a new rule, Rule 14a-11, which would allow shareholders meeting 
certain requirements to add director nominees in the company’s proxy materials. Said proposed 
changes were adopted in August of 2010. Additionally, activist investors are pressuring firms 
by submitting shareholder proposals to adopt majority rather than plurality voting rules for 
corporate boards. 
Despite what might be viewed as management entrenchment, the very threat of a proxy 
contest could lead to changes in the corporate culture. For example, 30 U.S. companies ceded 
board seats to dissidents who threatened proxy fights in 2008, up from 23 in the same period in 
2007 and nine in 2006. Recent academic work on shareholder activism includes Klein and Zur 
(2009), Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), and Clifford (2008). These authors focus on 
firm performance following the public disclosure that an activist investor (or hedge fund) has 
acquired a large block of stock, as filed with the SEC on Schedule 13-d. They note that activist 
hedge funds typically do not seek control of the firms in which they invest, with ownership 
stakes typically less than 10% of outstanding shares. Although such shareholdings are not 
generally sufficient for control purposes per se, the authors show that activist hedge funds are 
quite successful in enhancing shareholder value. 
Ownership less than that required for control, when coupled with the threat of proxy 
contests, suggests that the broader ownership structure of these firms is potentially important. 
That is, absent sufficient voting power to achieve corporate control, the potential for other 
shareholders to vote with an dissident poses a credible threat to which management must 
respond. At the same time, a natural question arises as to the nature of antitakeover measure in 
place at these firms and the extent to which management is indeed entrenched. Thus, the 
purpose of this study is to investigate the role of ownership structure and antitakeover measure 
in the context of proxy fights. 
In particular, we examine firms targeted via the proxy process for the three-year period 
from 2005 through 2007. Each proxy contest starts with a threat by activist investors of a proxy 
fight via the media (Media Threat). Among those battles, some cases can be finished after the 
negotiations, but the rest could proceed into a formal filing with the SEC by activist 
investors for a proxy fight (SEC Filing), and could even become a proxy fight or contested 
election. The development of the proxy contests can be described as follows: 
Media Threat  SEC Filing  Proxy Fight 
Because of the interlinked composition of the underlying subjects, we apply a three stage 
nested logit model. Based on this model and consistent with the literature, the results show that 
dissidents are more likely to launch a Media Threat (the first stage) against small firms with 
high agency costs, poor performance, and a high volume of prior shareholder proposals, which 
4 
 
pattern suggests shareholder dissatisfaction with the company. Those findings tend to suggest 
that the very threat of a proxy fight could act as a disciplining mechanism.  
In the stage following a Media Threat, the antitakeover mechanisms become the critical 
factors in determining the resolution of the contest. We find that firms with more independent 
boards are more likely to face a SEC Filing and less likely to settle proxy contests with activist 
investors. Furthermore, the existence of poison pills tends to help the two parties settle the 
contest without shareholder voting.   
In the third/final stage, the ownership structure tends to determine whether the contest is 
going to evolve into a proxy fight. We find that at this point in time, over the 2005 through 
2007 study period, it is the extent of ownership by insiders that really matters. When that 
insider ownership is low, it is more likely for the dissidents to carry the contest to the very end, 
the proxy fight. The results show that dissidents tend to take no action against firms when the 
ownership by investment companies is higher and more concentrated.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
explains the economic intuition of proxy contest. Section 3 explains the nested logit model. 
Section 4 describes the experimental design and sample construction. Section 5 explores the 
effects of ownership structure and antitakeover measure on shareholder activism. Section 6 
provides a discussion of conclusions.  
 
2. Economic intuition and literature review 
Proxy contest is viewed as an integral component of the control devices disciplining 
management (Mulherina and Poulsen, 1998; Dodd and Warner, 1983). A board seat embodies 
fiduciary duties. Activist investors, who generally possess industry, firm specific or takeover 
related expertise, often use proxy contests to get their representatives elected to the board. 
They take large positions in the target firm, show a bit of “jawboning” and explain why the 
firm is targeted by emphasizing on management inefficiency as reflected in poor firm 
performance, not only to the management but also to the public (Carleton, Nelson, and 
Weisbach, 1998; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989). It potentially can culminate in a proxy 
contest. On the other hand, management views the dissidents as disruptive and seeks to fortify 
their positions against the challenge from the activist investors.  Furthermore, management and 
dissidents also could come to the table to resolve the controversy. Indeed, management can 
take advice recommended by the activist investors or even invite them to join the board.  
In general, the following figure could illustrate the potential development of a proxy 
contest:  
 
Figure 1 – Development of a proxy contest (Nested Tree Structure)  
All Firms 
Nothing 
1 
First stage - 
Media Threat   
 
No Further Action 
after Media Threat 2         
  
 
 
Second stage - 
SEC Filing 
 
No Further Action 
after SEC Filing 3                     
  
Third Stage - proxy 
fight   4 
5 
 
Figure 1 shows the nested structure of proxy contest. It starts from the announcement of a 
proxy fight by dissidents, followed by dissidents filing with SEC to make the contest formal. 
The fight can be finished by shareholder voting at the annual shareholder meetings.  
During the first stage of a proxy contest, dissidents launch a Media Threat against those 
firms with which they are dissatisfied.  Clearly, shareholders generally are not satisfied with 
firms that are underperforming or have high agency costs. Thus, those firms tend to become 
ideal targets.  Additionally, the occurrence of prior shareholder proposals also could indicate 
shareholder dissatisfaction (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). 
Indeed, the majority of activist investors in the sample notify the public of the forthcoming 
proxy contests and state supportive rationales, mainly requesting firms to improve performance 
and take action, such as selling idle assets, repurchasing shares, issuing dividends, and so forth 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989). Thus, poor performance and high agency costs are 
considered the reason behind a Media Threat. Bratton (2007) discussed such a model in the 
study of the proxy contest between Mylan Inc. and Carl Icahn. Hence, we hypothesize that 
firms with high agency costs, poor performance, or prior shareholder proposals are more likely 
to become the target of a Media Threat.  
Meanwhile, on the initiation of a Media Threat, management could address the issues to 
avoid further confrontation. For example, to address high free cash flow problems, 
management can purchase company shares or increase dividends. In the case of the proxy 
contests between Carl Icahn and Mylan, “pre Icahn, Mylan had $1.8 billion of shareholders’ 
equity and no debt. Post Icahn, its shareholders’ equity stood at $787 million and long term 
debt at $685 million.” This 87% ratio of debt to equity arguably constrained managers’ 
freedom of action (Bratton, 2007). The above example suggests that with a positive response 
from management, the proxy contest could be ended at this stage and activist investors do not 
need to take further action. However, in our samples, only half of the proxy contests are ended 
at the first stage. The other half have moved to the second stage where the dissidents file their 
intentions with the SEC for a proxy fight.   
At this stage, the potential targets, such as those firms with fewer antitakeover devices and 
an independent board, tend to look “breakable.” Fewer antitakeover provisions indicate less of 
a barrier to a takeover attempt and thus less protection for management. In other words, the 
presence of antitakeover measure could not only limit the potential for outside monitors to 
discipline management but also insulate boards from being accountable to shareholders. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct the G-index, an index composed of 24 
antitakeover provisions and shareholders rights. They show that better shareholder rights are 
associated with greater firm value and better performance. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
select a subset of six provisions from the 24 employed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
and use this subset in an entrenchment index (E-index). Similarly, they find that higher 
entrenchment negatively affects firm value. In addition, among the six components of E-Index, 
staggered boards and poison pills are the most effective mechanisms. A staggered board is an 
exceptionally effective antitakeover device for management, since it requires only one third of 
the seats to be voted annually, and thus a minimum of two proxy fights is required to establish 
a majority of the seats in the board. A board also can install a poison pill at anytime without 
shareholder approval, and the combination of a staggered board and poison pills creates a 
strong barrier to invasion by activist investors (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002a, 
2002b; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Guo, Kruse, and Nohel, 2008; Mulherina and Poulsen, 
1998; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989). For example, Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian 
(2002a, 2002b) show that a classified board reduces the returns to hostile takeovers by 8-10%, 
and not a single hostile bid won a ballot box victory against a classified board over the period 
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1996-2000. Furthermore, unlike insiders or affiliated directors, independent directors are, 
arguably, more vigorous monitors because they are less entrenched. A diversified board is 
thereby less likely to be indebted to management (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998). 
Thus, a more independent board might suggest higher incentives within the board to enhance 
shareholder value, increasing the potential for the board to adopt proposed reforms. Hence, we 
hypothesize that firms with low antitakeover measure or with a more independent board are 
more likely to become the target of a SEC Filing.  
Proxy contests could be terminated at this stage if management follows advice as directed 
by the dissidents. Otherwise, activist investors either can drop the contest if they anticipate that 
majority shareholders support management or bring it to a contested election, the final stage of 
a proxy contest. 
Clearly, ownership structure plays an important role in this stage, since the victory of the 
proxy fight depends on how shareholders vote. Specifically, during the proxy fight, 
shareholders vote at the annual shareholder meeting, choosing between the two slates of 
directors, one from the current management and the other from the dissidents. The ideal target 
firms for a proxy fight should be those whose majority shareholders will vote against the 
incumbent teams and vote for the dissidents’ slates. Thus, the decision regarding whether to 
proceed after a SEC Filing depends on the projected support among all shareholders, especially 
large investors, including insiders, institutional shareholders, and blockholders. Insiders 
generally support the incumbent team and thus we expect the probability of a proxy fight to be 
negatively related to insider ownership.  
However, the role of institutional investors is ambiguous. With greater stakes, institutional 
shareholders have a greater incentive to become well informed to oversee the management. 
Nevertheless, it is costly to do so. Because the costs are paid by the institutional investors but 
the efforts from monitoring are reaped by all shareholders, this free-rider problem can seriously 
hold the institutions back. Representative studies on the role of institutional ownership include 
Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2002), who report that institutional ownership declines in the year 
prior to a forced CEO turnover, suggesting that institutions typically choose to sell their shares 
rather than intervene with a firm’s operations when they are dissatisfied with management. 
However, Hartzell and Starks (2003) found a strong negative relation between institutional 
ownership concentration and the level of executive compensation, which suggests that 
institutional investors are active in monitoring management. Consistent with this view, Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007) find that the net benefits to institutions of monitoring increase with the 
size of the stake, the length of time invested, and the independence of the institution. Several 
other studies suggest that funds monitor and vote their shares responsibly and pressure 
corporate management for reforms (Ashraf and Jayaraman, 2007; David and Kim, 2006; Duan, 
2008; Ng, Wang, and Zaiats, 2009).  
In contrast, some institutional investors, such as pension funds and university endowments 
and foundations, tend to allocate resources heavily to index. Those funds therefore have lack of 
motivation for monitoring (Coffee, 2010).     
Meanwhile, depending on the level of significance of the business ties with the 
management, institutional investors could vote unconditionally with management. Pressure 
sensitive institutional shareholders, such as banks and insurance companies, tend to have 
existing or potential business relations with management (Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; 
Pound, 1988; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos, 2011). On 
the contrary, pressure insensitive institutional investors, such as investment firms, independent 
investment advisors, and pension funds, are unlikely to have any business ties with 
management (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011).  
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In summation, the role of institutional investors after a SEC Filing is an empirical question. 
It depends on the monitoring outcomes as well as funds’ business ties with management. 
Similarly, when the number of institutional funds increases, institutional ownership is more 
dispersed, leading to reduced incentives for institutional investors to monitor due to the 
liquidity and control tradeoff (Coffee, 2010). Therefore, it is expected that the probability of a 
proxy fight will be positively related to the number of funds. In addition, it is expected that the 
Herfindahl index, a measure of institutional concentration, would negatively impact the 
likelihood of a proxy fight.1 
In contrast to typical institutional investors that often own only a small amount of a 
particular firm’s shares, there are investors holding large blocks of stocks. More generally, 
blockholders – institutional or otherwise – play an important role in corporate governance. 
During the past decade, blockholders, in the form of activist hedge funds, have become 
increasingly important. The actions taken by hedge funds include taking large positions in 
target firms, criticizing firms’ business plans and governance practices, confronting 
management, and demanding corrections to boost stock prices. Their involvement in proxy 
contests implies investment opportunity and, therefore, strengthens the belief that the targeted 
firm is underperforming. Thus, it is expected that a greater presence of activist blockholders or 
hedge funds would negatively impact the likelihood of a proxy fight. Recent work suggests that 
participation by hedge funds helps reduce agency costs and enhance firm value (Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler, 1998). In 
addition, hedge funds could be able to affect managerial decisions through the perceived threat 
of a proxy fight (Klein and Zur, 2009).   
Regarding the remaining blockholders, higher ownership by pressure insensitive 
blockholders can result in more voting for dissidents to enhance shareholder value. Meanwhile, 
pressure sensitive blockholders might support management unconditionally. Thus, it is an 
empirical question as to the role of blockholders after a SEC Filing. It depends on the 
blockholder type as well as its business relation with management.  
At issue, however, is that institutional investors and blockholders as individuals typically 
own small stakes in their portfolio firms. Even activist hedge funds typically own less than 
10% of the total shares, an amount that falls far short of a reasonable threshold for assuming 
corporate control. As a result, it appears that aggregate ownership structure also is important in 
assessing the ability to influence corporate management.  
In brief, activist investors identify underperforming firms as potential targets for a Media 
Threat. A Media Threat occurs when dissidents announce via the media the intention to launch 
a proxy fight with management. The ideal target is a firm with poor performance and high 
agency costs. The Media Threat can lead to private negotiations between dissidents and 
management, potentially ending the protest. Alternatively, activists can proceed to the next 
stage, formally filing for a proxy fight with the SEC. A firm with fewer antitakeover provisions 
and a more independent board is an ideal target, as managers are less entrenched and more 
susceptible to outside pressure. As with the Media Threat, the SEC Filing can lead to private 
negotiations, ending the contest. Otherwise, the process culminates in a proxy fight. The ideal 
target firm for a proxy fight is where shareholders tend to be more supportive of the dissidents 
than the management.     
Based on the above analysis, a three-level nested structure best describes the data structure 
of proxy contests, as shown in Figure 1. In particular, firms at the lower levels share certain 
firm characteristics similar to those at the upper levels because of the nested structure of data. 
                                                 
1 A higher Herfindahl index indicates greater concentrated institutional ownership.  
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For instance, activist investors target underperforming firms for a Media Threat. Hence, firms 
that face a SEC Filing or a proxy fight are all underperformers because all of them are targeted 
for a Media Threat. Accordingly, it is not necessary to use firm performance as a factor in the 
analysis of a SEC Filing or proxy fight. In sum, firm attributes included in the upper levels are 
shared by firms in the lower levels and thus, different firm features should be considered in 
different levels.  
It is important to recognize that proxy contests can be costly. Although a proxy contest at a 
small firm can cost as little as $100,000, the average cost can range between $200,000 and $1 
million (Bratton, 2007; Clifford, 2008). An example is a proxy contest between Sam Wyly and 
Computer Associates, Inc. According to the Los Angeles Times, both sides spent 
approximately $20 million on the fight, with the Computer Associates, Inc. management team 
attaining victory. 
 
3. Nested logit model 
3.1 Assumptions of the nested logit model 
Because of the data structure as described in Figure 1, we apply the nested logit model and 
evaluate the underlying assumptions.  
First, nested logit model is based on the assumption that each alternative can be partitioned 
into nests. Figure 1 clearly shows the nested structure of the proxy contests. Thus, this 
assumption is reasonably satisfied in this study.  
 Second, the nested logit model relaxes assumption of Independent and Identically 
Distributed (IID) and recognizes the possibility that “each alternative could have information 
in the unobserved influences of that alternative, which in turn has a role to play in determining 
an outcome that is different across the alternative branches” (Jones and Hensher, 2007). This 
difference implies that the variances of error might be different but the information content 
could be similar among subsets of alternatives generating some amount of correlation among 
these subsets (Jones and Hensher, 2007). Under the context of the proxy contests, IID indeed 
does not hold. In fact, the utilities of the third and the fourth outcomes are highly correlated in 
that the occurrence of both events depends on the contingency of the SEC Filing.  
Lastly, the application of a nested logit model relaxes the restriction that the choice 
between any two pairs of alternatives is simply a binary logit model (Cameron and Trivadi, 
2009). In other words, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) can be too restrictive 
under the nested logit model. Indeed, if the ‘No further action after a Media Threat’ in Figure 1 
is not an option anymore, then more cases of the ‘No further action after SEC Filing’ apply. 
This will change the ratio of the occurrence of the two mutually exclusive alternatives nested 
with SEC Filing.  
Of note, if IIA does not hold, then it is derivable that IID does not hold since IIA is a 
consequence of assuming that the errors are IID (Stata10 Manual, 2007).Accordingly, we test 
the assumption of IIA by applying the Hausman specification test to re-estimate the model on a 
subset of the alternatives since this test is not sensitive to the tree structure that we specify for a 
nested logit model (Stata10 Manual, 2007). Therefore, if IIA truly holds, there should not be 
any significant differences between the parameters obtained on the subset of alternatives and 
those obtained on the full set of alternatives. If the difference is proven significant, then the 
assumption of IIA does not hold. The test of the IIA assumption is in Section 5.  
 
3.2 Specifications of the nested logit model 
A nested logit model is based on a “choice” modeling concept. It assumes that decision 
makers are rational and choose from among their choices the option that brings the highest 
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utility. It means that given the utility function for each choice, respondents are expected to 
make the optimum choice. Based on the estimated utility from each available choice, as in the 
logit model, it is possible to obtain the optimum probability for each choice.  
π choice, i = e utility,i /    

n
i 1
e utility,i ,where i represents the ith choice among n alternatives.  
The decision making or choice structure could be complicated, causing the structure to 
become nested with many layers. In each layer, it is possible to get the probability for each 
choice from the above equation, except that the calculated probability for choice i is a 
conditional probability. Choice i’s marginal probability is equal to its conditional probability 
times the marginal probability of the prior event that is linked to choice i. Thus, it is possible to 
get marginal probability functions for all alternatives. Given that the choice is known, it is 
possible to obtain the log likelihood function, 
LnL= ln 

n
i 1
(π choice, i * occurrence choice i)  
where i represents the ith choice among n alternatives. 
Referring to Figure 1, while nothing represents the independent (degenerate branch) 
alternative, there is a hierarchy that establishes groupings such as Media Threat with two 
distinct branches: ‘No further action after Media Threat’ and SEC Filing. Continuing in the 
next level, ‘No further action after Media Threat’ presents an independent alternative, while 
SEC Filing is connected with two distinct alternatives: ‘No further action after SEC Filing’ and 
proxy fight.  
Figure 2 shows this three level nested tree structure for states of proxy contests. The four 
elemental alternatives are Nothing, No further action after Media Threat, No further action 
after SEC Filing, and proxy fight.  
  
 
Figure 2 - Nested Tree Structure for States of Proxy Contests 
Figure 2 shows the nested structure of proxy contest. It starts from the announcement of a 
proxy fight by dissidents (limb 2), followed by dissidents filing with SEC to make the contest 
formal (branch 3). The fight can be finished by shareholder voting at the annual shareholder 
meetings (formal proxy fight).  
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In Figure 2, the marginal outcomes are expressed in the limb levels, i.e., the outcome of 
Nothing and Media Threat state. There are two conditional outcomes. One outcome involves 
the probability of a SEC Filing state or a ‘No further action after Media Threat’; it is 
conditional on whether a firm falls under the Media Threat category. Another conditional 
outcome involves the probability of a ‘No further action after SEC Filing’ or a proxy fight; it is 
conditional on whether a firm falls under the SEC Filing category. Additionally, there are three 
nodes, Limb 1, Branch 1 and Branch 2, which are degenerated with only one extension.  
In sum, nested logit models start by first calculating the expected utilities of the bottom 
levels, with utilities at higher levels including the expected utilities from lower level outcomes. 
Based on the expected utilities at each level, the maximum likelihood (ML) function equals the 
log of sum of each utility times the corresponding proxy contest outcome (indicator variable).  
This ML function is concave and has efficient and consistent solutions.  
The utility models at each level are as follows.  
Utility Media Threat 
= γ(1)[β1(1)*Free_Cash_Flow + β2(1)*Leverage + β3(1)*Market_Book + β4(1)Stock_Returns + 
β5(1)*Firm_Size + β6(1)Shareholder_Proposals + 1/λ(1,1)×IV(1)] 
Where,  
IV(1) = ln(e
(λ(1,1) utility of SEC Filing + eλ(2,1) utility of No further actions after Media Threat )       (1) 
 
Utility SEC Filing =  λ(1,1)[β1(1,1)*Poison_Pills + β2(1,1)*Staggered_Board + β3(1,1)*Approve_Merger 
+ β4(1,1) *Amend_Bylaw + β5(1,1)* Amend_Charter + β6(1,1)* Board_Independence + IV(1,1) ] 
Where,  
IV(1,1) = ln(e
(utility of proxy fight) + e(utility of No further actions after SEC Filing )).         (2) 
 
Utility proxy fight  
= β1a*Insider_Ownership +β2a*Blockholder_Ownership +β3a*Institution_Ownership + 
β4a*No._of_funds + β5a* Active_blockholder.            (3) 
 
In Appendix A, we report the theoretical analysis of the nested logit model in the context of 
proxy contests.   
 
4. Sample selection and data 
We collected the publicized threats of proxy contests from Lexis-Nexis by using key 
words: proxy fight, proxy battle, proxy contest, proxy solicitation, consent solicitation, solicit 
proxies, soliciting proxies, and solicitation of proxies. The search is focused within the 2005 
through 2007 period because of data availability in the Corporate Library (TCL). A total of 254 
potential proxy contests are identified within the sample period, of which 197 cases have filed 
DEF 14A forms with the SEC and 52 have ended with a shareholder vote.  
We collected the data with respect to antitakeover measure, board composition, and 
ownership by blockholders and insiders from TCL. In total, there are 8,257 observations from 
2005 through 2007 in the sample. We deleted 13 observations due to missing values for  
“annual meeting date”. We also collected the status of classified boards and poison pills, 
percentage of outstanding shares required to amend bylaws, percentage of outstanding shares 
required to amend company charters, and percentage of outstanding shares required to approve 
a merger or sale from TCL.2 Where the percentage of the above three variables is greater than 
                                                 
2 From TCL: BDClassified - classified board. TDPoisonPills - position pills in position. TDBylawVotePercent - 
percentage of outstanding shares required to amend bylaws. TDCharterVotePercent - percentage of outstanding 
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66.67%, the threshold for super majority, it is recorded as 1. Otherwise, it is recorded as 0. 
Additionally, board size and number of outside directors from TCL are recorded to help reflect 
the level of board independence.  
Stock market information is taken from CRSP, and stock returns for each firm are 
calculated on a fiscal year basis. For example, firm A’s fiscal year ends in July. Thus, its 
annual return is calculated from August in the previous year to July this year, adjusted for the 
value weighted market return in the same time frame.  
Data related to operating income before depreciation; capital expenditures (Schedule V) of 
property, plant and equipment; long term debt; short term debt; total asset; stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year; outstanding common shares; and total equity are collected from 
COMPUSTAT, focusing on the period of 2004 to 2007.3 Leverage, market to book ratio, firm 
size, and free cash flows also are constructed. Free cash flows are calculated by subtracting 
capital expenditures (Schedule V) of property, plant and equipment from operating income 
before depreciation and scaled by total assets.  Leverage equals the sum of long term debt and 
short term debt divided by the value of total assets. Market to book ratio equals the sum of total 
assets, the product of stock price at the end of the fiscal year, and outstanding common shares, 
minus total equity, and divided by total asset. Firm size equals the value of total assets. Firm 
size and market to book ratio are transformed by log and leverage by square root to reduce 
kurtosis and skewness. Additionally, to control for the industry effect, all of the above 
accounting variables are adjusted by industry means, following Fama and French (1997) who 
define 49 industries in the market.   
Quarterly ownership by institutional investors from the Thompson CDA/Spectrum 13F 
institutional ownership data were collected for the sample. We also divided the sample into 
five groups by manager type code as defined in Thompson. We then calculated the aggregate 
ownership and counted the number of funds by all institutional investors and by each manager 
type. The Herfindahl Index (H) measures the ownership dispersion of institutional investors 
and was calculated as follows:   
H= 

N
i 1
Si
2             (4) 
where Si is defined as the market share of fund i in the market, and N is the number of funds.  
We also calculated the normalized Herfindahl index: 
H* = 
N
NH
/11
/1


                                                                                      (5) 
where N is the number of firms in the market and H is the Herfindahl Index as above. A low 
index value indicates dispersed ownership by institutional investors with no dominant players, 
whereas a high index value means that there is concentrated institutional ownership in the firm. 
The presence of active shareholders was collected from Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval (EDGAR) by checking each blockholder who has filed SEC Schedule 13-d with 
the targeted firms. 
                                                                                                                                                          
shares required to amend company charter. TDMergerVotePercent - percentage of outstanding shares required to 
approve a merger or sale.  
3 OIBDP- operating income before depreciation. CAPXV - capital expenditures (schedule V) of property, plant 
and equipment. DLTT - long term debt. DLC - short term debt. AT - total asset. PRCC_F – stock price at the end 
of the fiscal year. CSHO - common shares outstanding. CEQ – total equity. 
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 Activist investors are investors who are dissatisfied with management and attempt to bring 
changes within a firm without any change in control (Gillan and Starks, 2000, 2007). Their 
approach includes submitting shareholder proposals and launching a proxy fight, with the latter 
often more time consuming and more expensive than the former. Additionally, unlike proxy 
fights, shareholder proposals are non-binding in nature. Management is not obligated to adopt 
any proposals including those with majority shareholder support. Thus, activist investors use 
proposals as an approach to express their concerns about corporate governance and firm 
performance. Therefore, prior shareholder proposals are used as a proxy for shareholder 
dissatisfaction in this study. Shareholder proposal data with a total of 5,222 observations from 
2004 to 2008 were collected from IRRC, with 4,345 nonsocial shareholder proposals. We 
include proposals in 2004 in this study to control for the occurrence of shareholder activism in 
2005. 
The final data set consists of 6,333 observations out of the total of 8,257 TCL firms from 
2005 through 2007. Among them, there are 126 Media Threats, 55 SEC Filings of a proxy 
fight, and 29 proxy fights. Figure 3 shows the comparison of Media Threat, SEC Filings, and 
proxy fights with non-target cases (Nothing).  
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Figure 3 - Comparison of Media Threat, SEC Filing, proxy fight with Nothing  
Figure 3 shows the comparison of frequency of Media Threat, SEC Filing, and proxy fight 
with non-target observations. 
There are several concerns about this set of proxy contest data. One concern is that by the 
end of 2007, some contests might not be over. For example, one company might be threatened 
for a proxy fight via media in 2007 but the SEC Filing or proxy fight could occur in 2008 
instead. In such circumstances, they are recorded as a Media Threat in 2007 only, rather than 
SEC Filing or proxy fight. Thus, we revisited proxy contest data for 2007. There were five 
such cases. In three, the fights started in October of 2007 and ended in January of 2008. In the 
fourth case, CSX Corporation had a Media Threat on October 16, 2007, and it was resolved by 
shareholder voting on June 25, 2008 at the annual shareholder meeting. The final instance was 
the Steak n Shake Company, whose fight is from October 1, 2007 to March 12, 2008. The 
outcomes of the proxy contests are adjusted accordingly. 
Second, Media Threat and information regarding proxy fights were collected from Lexis - 
Nexis and Securities Data Company (SDC). Meanwhile, SEC Filing information was collected 
from EDGAR. Therefore, there is the possibility that there could be records of SEC Filings 
without documentation regarding Media Threats, or cases of proxy fights without SEC Filing. 
To address these concerns, we checked the three data sets individually. All cases of SEC 
Filings, except for the three records of Alaska Airline Co., have preceding reports of Media 
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Threats. However, the proxy contests faced by Alaska Airline Co. are special cases. Indeed, a 
group of individuals, including Richard Foley, Steve Neiman, and members of the Osorne 
family, have filed an intention of a proxy fight with the SEC every year since 2003.  The latest 
filing by this group was on August 14, 2008. In their definitive proxy statements, they propose 
almost the same nominees of directors for election every year. However, none of the contests 
have proceeded to become an actual proxy fight. The possible reason for ending the contest 
before a proxy fight is due to the dissidents’ application of online communication with 
shareholders and their adoption of the campaign of proxy contest via the internet, which were 
exceptions to SEC rules at that time.  
The last concern about the three data sets focuses on the possibility of multiple fights over 
the sample periods. Checking the three data sets, there were neither multiple proxy fights nor 
multiple SEC Filings within each firm. However, instances of two Media Threats in the same 
year were found in eight firms. For example, MCI was targeted twice in 2005. The dissidents, 
Qwest and Deephaven Capital Management Fund, launched a Media Threat against MCI in 
April and June 2005, respectively. In these instances, a single record was kept while the second 
was discarded to avoid data clustering concerns. Thus, after deleting eight duplications, the 
final sample has 126 cases of Media Threats.  
 
5. Data analysis 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
Panels A, B, C and D in Table 1 report summary statistics for four groups, respectively: 
Nothing, Media Threat, SEC Filing, and proxy fight. The mean of stock returns is positive for 
the Nothing group, but is negative for the other three groups. However, the median values of 
stock returns are negative for all groups. For all the other variables, the means have the same 
sign among the four groups.  
Table 2 reports the difference of means testing between Nothing and Media Threat at the 
first level, between no further actions after Media Threat and SEC Filing at the middle level, 
and between no further actions after SEC Filing and proxy fight at the bottom level, using the 
Wilcoxon method. Z values are reported. 
When comparing between the two events at the first level, (1) non-target firms and (2) 
Media Threat firms (the target), the results show that activist investors tend to target large 
firms. They also tend to target firms with poor performance, as indicated by negative signs for 
market to book ratio as well as for stock returns. The proxies for agency costs, (1) free cash 
flows and (2) leverage ratio, are not significantly different between the two groups. 
Additionally, the results show that target firms have more shareholder proposals than non-
target firms.    
When comparing the two events at the middle level, (1) no further actions after Media 
Threat, and (2) SEC Filing for a proxy fight, the two groups nested under Media Threat, we 
find no evidence of significant differences in the status of poison pills; staggered board; and 
supermajority requirements of merger, charter, and bylaws between the two groups. 
Additionally, the results show no compelling evidence that activist investors tend to target 
firms with a more independent board. 
When comparing the two events at the bottom level, (1) no further action after SEC Filing 
and (2) proxy fight, both nested under SEC Filing, ownership structure comparison indicates 
no evidence that activist investors target firms with greater institutional ownership. However, 
the results provide evidence that dissidents tend to target firms with fewer funds and with more 
concentrated institutional ownership. Activist investors also tend to target firms with more 
blockholder ownership, but there is no evidence of significant differences of insider ownership 
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between the two groups. Additionally, the results show no evidence that dissidents are less 
likely to target firms with the presence of active blockholders.  
5.2. Nested logit models – examination of assumptions 
The purpose of the multivariate analysis is to investigate the association between the 
development of a proxy contest and firm characteristics, in four dimensions: antitakeover 
measure, ownership structure, agency costs, and firm performance. To accomplish this, a three 
level nested logit model is used. As shown in Figure 2, the first level includes 6,207 
observations of Nothing firms (non-target firms) and 126 occurrences of Media Threat. The 
middle level includes 71 observations of no further action after Media Threat and 55 cases of 
SEC Filings. The bottom level has 26 cases of no further action after SEC Filing and 29 proxy 
fights. Additionally, following Hensher, Ross, and Greene (2005), the choices of Nothing and 
no further action after Media Threat at the top and the middle levels, respectively, are extended 
to the bottom, serving as two elementary alternatives in the bottom level.  
The nested logit model relaxes the restriction of IIA across the alternatives. In particular, 
the IIA assumption test is used to answer the question:  Are the odds ratios ‘No further action 
after SEC Filing’ and proxy fight really independent from the presence of the alternatives 
Nothing and ‘No further action after Media Threat’? Following the literature, we use the 
Hausman specification to test the IIA assumption. This method estimates the conditional logit 
model on full sample (βa as estimated coefficients and Ωa as estimated covariance matrix) and 
subsample (βb as estimated coefficients and Ωb as estimated covariance matrix) individually. 
The subsample is created by eliminating choice Nothing from the alternative set and by 
estimating a three choice model. Thus, 6,207 observations under Nothing are eliminated. The 
new subsample has 126 observations of Media Threats nested with 71 cases of ‘No further 
action after Media Threats’ and 55 cases of SEC Filing. The latter alternative has 26 events of 
‘No further action after SEC Filing’ and 29 proxy fights. If IIA holds, there should not be any 
significant differences between the two sets of estimates. Additionally, the quadratic form of 
(βa - βb)’(Ωa - Ωb)-1 (βa - βb) has a chi-square distribution. Figure 4 shows the new tree structure 
after eliminating Nothing from the sample.  
  
 
Figure 4:  New Nested Tree Structure 
Figure 4 shows the nested tree structure of proxy contest, starting from Media Threat. It is 
for testing IIA assumption of nested logit model.  
Next, we run the Hausman test with total assets, free cash flow, market to book ratio, 
leverage, prior shareholder proposals, poison pills, board independence, institutional 
ownership, and blockholder ownership. This strategy is appropriate due to the small sample 
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size of the subgroup. The purpose of the Hausman test is to demonstrate IIA assumption for 
some variables; hence, using certain variables while excluding the rest should not distort the 
conclusions.  
The results are reported in Table 3. Panels A and B of Table 3 report the estimates from the 
full sample and subsample respectively, applying the conditional logit model. Panel C in Table 
3 reports the results from the Hausman test. The chi-square value is 121.76, suggesting that the 
hypothesis that IIA holds can be rejected at the 1% significance level.   
Another approach to test IIA assumption is to apply the likelihood ratio test (LRT), which 
tests the goodness of fit between the nested logit model and the conditional nested model. The 
two models differ only in the dissimilarity parameters, which are set to equal to 1 in the 
conditional logit model while they are unconstrained for estimation purposes in the nested logit 
model. The LRT uses the following equation to compare the likelihood scores of the two 
models:  
LR = 2*(lnLconditional logit model - lnLnested logit model) 
This LRT statistic follows a chi-square distribution. The degree of freedom is equal to the 
number of additional parameters in the more complete model, which is 2, coming from the 
dissimilarity parameters for Media Threat and SEC Filing. The dissimilarity parameters for the 
two degenerate branches are set to 1 in the nested logit model, the same as in the conditional 
logit model.  The result of LRT is reported in Table 4 as part of the procedures of a nested logit 
model. The chi-square is 87.24, with 2 degrees of freedom. Thus, the IIA assumption is 
rejected at the 1% statistical significance level once again.  
In summary, the IIA assumption does not hold by applying both the Hausman test and the 
likelihood ratio test. Thus, the nested logit model is more appropriate.4 The detailed utility and 
probability functions derived from the nested logit model are reported in Appendix B.  
5.3. Discussion of regression results 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results from running the nested logit model. Among the 
variables for Media Threat, the coefficient of stock return is negative, indicating that activist 
investors tend to target firms with poor performance for a Media Threat. The corresponding 
average marginal effect (AME) is -0.011, implying that for a 1% increase of stock returns, the 
estimated probability of a Media Threat rather than Nothing decreases by 0.011%. The similar 
conclusion can be drawn from market to book ratio. For a 1% decrease of market to book ratio 
(log), the estimated probability of a Media Threat increases by 0.02%. 
 Furthermore, the results confirm in a statistically significant fashion that activist investors 
tend to target firms with high agency costs. Specifically, for a 1% increase of scaled free cash 
flow, the estimated likelihood of a Media Threat rather than Nothing increases by 0.0015%. 
However, leverage ratio, which is another proxy for agency costs, is not statistically 
significant. Additionally, if there is one more prior proposal, the estimated likelihood increases 
by 0.023%. Lastly, dissidents tend to target small firms. Indeed, when firm size (log) decreases 
by 1%, the estimated probability of a Media Threat rather than Nothing increases by 0.0032%. 
                                                 
4 We use Stata10 to run the nested logit model. Stata10 produces a nested logit model that is consistent with 
random utility maximization (RUM) [Stata10 Manual, 2007; Heiss, 2002). We use the default settings for nested 
logit model under Stata10. For the numerical root finding method, the default setting is Newton-Raphson 
algorithm. For the type of variance – covariance matrix, the default is observed information matrix (OIM), the 
inverse of the negative Hessian matrix (Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney, 2008). In addition, all models have no 
constant variables since all independent variables are non-variant among alternatives, which require keeping one 
alternative as base in each level and using the interaction between the alternative and the independent variables to 
create variations in independent variables.  
 
16 
 
The finding confirms that dissidents tend to target small firms because they can more easily 
acquire a significant stake in those firms to start a contest.  
Among the variables for events at the middle level, the results confirm in a statistically 
significant fashion that activist investors tend to target firms with a more independent board for 
a SEC Filing, because outside directors are less likely to be beholden to management and 
arguably strive to enhance shareholder value. Thus, with a 1% increase of board independence, 
the estimated likelihood of a SEC Filing increases significantly by 0.147%. Additionally, a 1% 
increase of board independence is associated with a 0.125% decrease in the estimated 
occurrence of dissidents taking no further actions and ending the contest. In addition, the 
results show evidence that dissidents tend not to file with SEC for a proxy fight when the firm 
has poison pills. When a firm establishes a poison pill, its likelihood to settle the contest 
increases significantly by 0.198%. However, none of the other antitakeover provisions are 
significant, including staggered board.  
Among the variables for events at the bottom level, the results confirm in a statistically 
significant fashion that activist investors tend to target firms with less insider ownership for a 
proxy fight. With an increase of 1% insider ownership, the estimated likelihood of a proxy 
fight decreases by 0.033%. The results suggest that the insiders tend to support management 
and thus higher insider ownership would prevent the contest from culminating to an actual 
proxy fight.  Furthermore, the results provide no evidence that institutional ownership and 
blockholder ownership are statistically significant.  Additionally, activist investors do not 
target firms with more dispersed ownership of institutional investors. Since the number of 
funds is in relation to the dispersion of institutional shareholders, we rerun the test but replace 
the number of funds and institutional ownership by the normalized Herfindahl index as a 
robustness test. However, the Herfindahl index is not significant. Thus, the role of the 
institutional investors in a proxy fight still appears to be inconclusive and needs to be 
investigated further. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Lastly, we find no evidence 
that the presence of active shareholders can exert greater pressure over management to force 
them to settle the contest with dissidents prior to the annual shareholder meeting.  
Furthermore, for some variables such as firm size, we identify differences either in the 
statistical significance level or in the signs when comparing Table 2 and Panel A of Table 4. 
Table 2 shows the simple pair wise mean comparison based on the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
method without considering the nested structure of the data set, while Table 4 is based on the 
nested logit model. Of note, the dissimilarity parameters, or the parameters for the inclusive 
values (IV), are set to equal to one for the three degenerate nodes, as shown in Figure 2. For 
the two branches with nests, Media Threat and SEC Filing, their dissimilarity parameters both 
are significantly different from one as reported in Panel B in Table 4. 
Figure 5 plots the marginal probabilities of Media Threat for stock return while holding all 
the other variables fixed at sample mean, except for indicator variables whose values equal to 1 
for all observations. 
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Figure 5 - Marginal probability of Media Threat and Stock Returns  
Similarly, Figure 6 and 7 plot the marginal probabilities of SEC Filing for board 
independence level and the proxy fight for insider ownership, respectively.  
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Figure 6 - Marginal probability of SEC Filing and board independence level 
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Figure 7 - Marginal probability of proxy fight and insider ownership 
 
5.4. The role of institutional investors   
The study thus far indicates that the role of the aggregated institutional ownership on proxy 
fight is ambiguous. However, as discussed in Section 2, well informed institutional investors 
with a substantial stake can exert influence on management and reduce agency costs. Thus, we 
revisit this subject with detailed institutional ownership taken into consideration. In particular, 
following Thompson CDA/Spectrum 13F, we separate institutional investors into five groups: 
banks, insurance companies, investment companies and their managers, independent 
investment advisors, and others (pension funds, university endowments, and foundations). 
Each group has variant monitoring inclination and capabilities. For example, pension funds are 
pressure insensitive investors and generally hold index funds. Thus, they tend to vote with the 
dissidents without monitoring.  By contrast, banks or insurance companies are pressure 
sensitive investors. They tend to vote with management unconditionally (Brickley, Lease, and 
Smith, 1988; Pound, 1988; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). 
With detailed ownership by institutional investors and a corresponding number of funds, 
we rerun the nested logit model using the same nested tree structure. The results are reported in 
Panel A of Table 5.5 IIA also is strongly rejected, indicating that it is suitable to apply the 
nested logit model.  
The focus is on the likelihood of a Media Threat. The results show that for a 1% decrease 
of firm size, the likelihood of a Media Threat increases by 0.0034%; for a 1% decrease of 
holding period return (market to book ratio), the likelihood increases by 0.0161% (0.0222%); 
for a 1% increase of shareholder proposals, it increases by 0.0254%. Regarding the likelihood 
of a SEC Filing, the results show that after firms adopt poison pills, the likelihood of a SEC 
filing drops by 0.0156%; for a 1% increase of board independence level, the likelihood 
increases by 0.1661%. The results basically are consistent with those in Panel A of Table 4.  
                                                 
5 Type II for investment companies is not included in the Model. We use Type II as the base of the other four 
types.  
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Regarding the role of institutional investors in proxy fights, the results show that when the 
ownership by investment firms increases by 1%, the likelihood of proxy fights (no further 
actions after SEC Filling) decreases (increases) by 0.4082% (0.4581%). Additionally, when the 
number of funds of investment firms (pension funds, etc.) increases by 1%, the likelihood of no 
further actions after SEC Filing decreases by 0.0044% (0.1234%); when number of funds of 
banks (independent investment advisors) increases by 1%, the likelihood of proxy fight 
decreases by 0.0007% (0.0006%), and when the number of pension funds increases by 1%, the 
likelihood of proxy fight increases by 0.0002%. The results show that dissidents tend to take no 
action against firms when the ownership by investment companies is higher and more 
concentrated. Regarding pension funds, when the ownership gets more dispersed, the 
likelihood of a proxy fight increases. On the contrary, when banks’ ownership gets more 
dispersed, it is less likely for a proxy fight to occur. Thus, the findings suggest that the market 
expects investment firms and banks to support management whereas pension funds are 
expected to endorse dissidents. This is generally consistent with the view that banks are 
pressure sensitive institutions and pension funds are pressure insensitive investors.  
Regarding the role of blockholders, the results show that for a 1% increase in the 
ownership of blockholders, the likelihood of no further action after SEC Filing decreases by 
0.0201%, suggesting that blockholders are expected to support the dissidents. However, insider 
ownership is not significant anymore as shown in Panel A of Table 4.  
In summary, the puzzle regarding the role of the institutional investors seems resolved. 
Panel A of Table 5 also confirms that major findings in Panel A of Table 4 are robust.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of ownership structure and antitakeover measure in proxy 
contests for corporate control from 2005 through 2007. Each proxy contest can go through 
from one to three continuous stages, following this chain of action:  
 
Media Threat  SEC Filing  Proxy Fight 
This study contributes to the literature by applying the nested logit model to studying the 
nature of proxy contest. While the nested logit model has been applied in the transportation and 
consumer behavior fields, its application in the accounting and finance fields still is rare. 
However, when IIA and IID are violated, this method is preferable to the multinomial logit 
model and the conditional logit model. Worth noting is that there is not a conventional rule for 
the designation of the nested tree structure. Thus, it is an ad hoc decision that rests with the 
researcher.  
The results from running the nested logit model show that, unlike typical shareholders who 
are passive investors, activist investors demand management to act to enhance shareholder 
value. They start by identifying small underperforming firms with high agency costs and more 
prior shareholder proposals for a Media Threat of a proxy contest. Obviously, rewards from 
investing in these firms could be high if management adopts the recommendations of the 
dissidents.  
Next, dissidents tend to target firms with more independent boards for a SEC Filing to 
make the contest more formal and intense. Unlike insiders and affiliated directors, outside 
directors potentially are vigorous monitors and are less likely to beholden to management. 
Attaining their endorsement can exert more pressure over management for reforms. If nothing 
happens after the SEC Filing, dissidents tend to target firms with more insider ownership for a 
proxy fight. Furthermore, firms with higher and concentrated ownership by investment 
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companies, with fewer banking funds, and with more pension funds (or university endowments 
and foundations) also are potential targets for a proxy fight. The presence of investment 
companies that monitor can exert pressure on management when management does not reward 
shareholders adequately.  
Finally, antitakeover measure can block the takeover attempts and thus reinforce 
management’s position. The study suggests the importance of poison pills in proxy contests 
and shows that a firm is less likely to have a contested election if it has poison pills. 
Overall, this study investigates the association between a three stage proxy contest and firm 
attributes in agency costs, firm performance, antitakeover measure, and ownership structure. 
However, each proxy contest is a dynamic process in that both parties continually incorporate 
new information to find the most optimal “fighting” strategies at each stage. Thus, a more 
detailed analysis of the development of proxy contests is an interesting topic for future 
research.  
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Table 1 – Panel A 
 Univariate Analysis of the Nothing Firms 
This table shows the univariate analysis of the firms in the Nothing group in The Corporate Library (TCL) from 
2005 through 2007. Out of the total of 6,333 firms in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not targets of 
proxy fights and thereby are classified into Nothing group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists 
via media, among which 55 firms (SEC Filing) are threatened further when activists file form DEF 14A with the 
SEC. Only 29 firms end proxy fights via shareholder voting (proxy fight). 
 
Variables Mean Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis N 
Total asset (log)  1.83 1.68 -3.98 12.27 0.54 1.14 6207 
Market adjusted return 0.03 -0.01 -1.06 4.17 1.71 8.58 6207 
Free cash flow 0.97 0.45 -5.06 20.98 6.19 48.15 6207 
Leverage ratio (square root) -0.08 -0.05 -1.38 1.82 0.07 0.86 6207 
Market to book ratio (log)  -0.10 -0.15 -1.70 3.11 0.84 1.82 6207 
Shareholder proposal (square root) 0.13 0.00 0.00 13.00 9.57 131.9 6207 
Institutional investors ownership 0.73 0.77 0.00 4.07 -0.09 5.67 6207 
Herfindahl index – log -17.50 -17.41 -22.49 -4.70 0.40 4.00 6207 
Number of institutional funds 194.01 140.00 1.00 1,539.00 2.97 11.94 6207 
Insider ownership 0.14 0.06 0.00 1.00 2.12 4.23 6207 
Blockholder ownership 0.23 0.21 0.00 1.26 1.09 1.89 6207 
Board independence 0.82 0.86 0.33 1.00 -1.19 1.34 6207 
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Table 1 – Panel B 
Univariate Analysis of the Media Threat Firms 
This table shows the univariate analysis of the Media Threat firms in The Corporate Library (TCL) from 2005 
through 2007. Out of the total of 6,333 firms in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not targets of proxy 
fights and thereby are classified into Nothing group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists via 
media, among which 55 firms (SEC Filing) are threatened further when activists file form DEF 14A with the SEC. 
Only 29 firms end proxy fights via shareholder voting (proxy fight). 
 
Variables Mean Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis N 
Total asset (log)  2.06 1.92 -1.43 7.90 0.53 0.88 126 
Market adjusted return -0.09 -0.13 -0.77 1.42 1.10 2.23 126 
Free cash flow 1.32 0.53 -0.24 20.42 4.64 27.18 126 
Leverage ratio (square root) -0.05 -0.04 -1.38 0.63 -0.86 3.93 126 
Market to book ratio (log)  -0.30 -0.35 -1.70 0.82 -0.10 0.83 126 
Shareholder proposal (square root) 0.21 0.00 0.00 3.32 3.29 12.85 126 
Institutional investors ownership 0.76 0.78 0.00 1.21 -0.51 0.67 126 
Number of institutional funds 214.29 138.50 5.00 1,431.00 2.83 9.23 126 
Herfindahl index – log -17.74 -17.56 -22.27 -12.96 -0.40 1.19 126 
Insider ownership 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.88 3.80 21.77 126 
Blockholder ownership 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.64 0.23 -0.89 126 
Board independence 0.85 0.88 0.54 1.00 -1.47 3.18 126 
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Table 1– Panel C 
Univariate Analysis of the SEC Filing Firms 
This table shows the univariate analysis of the SEC Filing firms in The Corporate Library (TCL) from 2005 
through 2007. Out of the total of 6,333 firms in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not targets of proxy 
fights and thereby are classified into Nothing group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists via 
media, among which 55 firms (SEC Filing) are threatened further when activists file form DEF 14A with the SEC. 
Only 29 firms end proxy fights via shareholder voting (proxy fight). 
 
Variables Mean Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis N 
Total asset (log)  2.15 1.99 -1.08 5.77 -0.12 -0.10 55 
Market adjusted return -0.06 -0.08 -0.77 1.02 0.80 0.65 55 
Free cash flow 2.04 0.84 -0.24 20.42 3.24 12.25 55 
Leverage ratio (square root) -0.06 -0.05 -1.38 0.63 -1.03 4.27 55 
Market to book ratio (log)  -0.30 -0.30 -1.70 0.82 -0.33 1.21 55 
Shareholder proposal (square root) 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.73 2.34 4.17 55 
Institutional investors ownership 0.76 0.77 0.00 1.21 -0.58 0.61 55 
Number of institutional funds 191.11 130.00 5.00 849.00 2.04 4.27 55 
Herfindahl index – log -17.52 -17.35 -21.30 -12.96 0.23 0.97 55 
Insider ownership 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.43 1.83 3.15 55 
Blockholder ownership 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.64 0.30 -0.95 55 
Board independence 0.84 0.88 0.60 1.00 -1.26 1.23 55 
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Table 1 – Panel D 
Univariate Analysis of the Proxy Fight Firms 
This table shows the univariate analysis of the proxy fight in The Corporate Library (TCL) from 2005 through 
2007. Out of the total of 6,333 firms in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not targets of proxy fights 
and thereby are classified into Nothing group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists via media, 
among which 55 firms (SEC Filing) are threatened further when activists file form DEF 14A with the SEC. Only 
29 firms end proxy fights via shareholder voting (proxy fight). 
 
Variables Mean Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis N 
Total asset (log)  2.41 2.13 -1.08 5.77 0.05 0.19 29 
Market adjusted return -0.03 -0.12 -0.59 1.02 1.13 0.83 29 
Free cash flow 2.08 0.78 -0.01 10.22 1.95 2.33 29 
Leverage ratio (square root) -0.06 -0.05 -0.41 0.53 0.36 -0.26 29 
Market to book ratio (log)  -0.23 -0.23 -1.23 0.83 0.23 0.34 29 
Shareholder proposal (square root) 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.41 1.68 1.15 29 
Institutional investors ownership 0.75 0.77 0.00 1.17 -0.75 1.05 29 
Number of institutional funds 214.38 150.00 5.00 849.00 1.90 3.98 29 
Herfindahl index – log -17.71 -17.72 -21.30 -12.96 0.48 1.26 29 
Insider ownership 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.43 1.88 3.44 29 
Blockholder ownership 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.59 0.43 -0.67 29 
Board independence 0.83 0.86 0.63 0.92 -1.00 -0.27 29 
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Table 2 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney Test  
This table shows the mean comparison between Nothing group and Media Threat group, between No further 
actions after Media Threat group and SEC Filing group, and between No further actions after SEC Filing group 
and proxy fight group, using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test. Z values are reported. Out of the total of 6,333 firms 
in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not targets of proxy fights and thereby are classified into Nothing 
group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists via media, among which 55 firms (SEC Filing) are 
threatened further when activists file form DEF 14A with the SEC. Only 29 firms end proxy fights via shareholder 
voting (proxy fight). 
  
  All Firms Media Threat    SEC Filing  
  
Nothing vs. Media 
Threat 
No further actions 
after Media Threat  
vs. SEC Filing 
No further actions 
after  SEC Filing 
vs. Voted 
 Variables 
Wilcoxon Test - z 
Value 
Wilcoxon Test - z 
Value 
Wilcoxon Test - z 
Value 
Total asset (log)  1.6032 * 1.1019 -1.2897 * 
Market adjusted return -3.8296 *** 0.4673 -0.2276 
Free cash flow 1.0261 1.8299 ** 0.2613 
Leverage ratio (square root) 1.2701 -0.364 0.0253 
Market to book ratio (log)  -4.7772 *** 0.3788 -0.7333 
Shareholder proposal (square root) 2.8248 ** -0.3523 -1.2796 
Institutional investors ownership 0.9428 0.1771 0.1264 
Number of institutional funds 0.2404 -0.7182 -1.5089* 
Herfindahl index (log) -1.5621 * 1.0035 1.3234 * 
Insider ownership -2.8669 *** 0.8831 0.2023 
Blockholder ownership 2.2293 ** 0.7997 1.8125 ** 
Filing of 13d –active blockholders -0.0006 -0.7752 -1.1859 
Staggered board -0.2820 -0.0854 -0.3703 
Poison pills 3.6143 *** -1.1969 -0.3703 
Requirement  to approve a merger -0.3051 -0.4342 -0.2336 
Requirement  to amend bylaws 1.1896 0.4639 -0.3214 
Requirement to amend company charter -0.1137 0.0441 1.1242 
Board independence 4.1877 *** -0.5985 0.7023 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3 – Panel A 
Hausman Test on IIA Assumption Step One  
This is the first step in testing IIA assumption with Hausman specification. This step applies conditional logit 
model based on the full sample with no nesting which includes 6,207 cases of non-target observations, 126 cases 
of Media Threat, among which 71 are without further actions after a Media Threat and 55 cases have run into SEC 
Filing of a proxy fight, after which 26 cases are settled without shareholder voting but 29 cases are voted 
eventually.  
 
Variables Alternatives Coefficient z 
Market adjusted return SEC Filing -0.3958** -2.46 
Poison pills SEC Filing -2.1961*** -11.21 
Blockholder ownership SEC Filing -20.6261*** -25.51 
Shareholder proposal (square root) SEC Filing -1.9537*** -5.98 
Total asset (log) Voted 0.0097 0.10 
Board independence Voted -4.5999*** -7.32 
Institutional ownership Voted 1.6977*** 2.71 
Free cash flow Voted 0.1305** 2.32 
Leverage ratio (square root) Voted 1.0523* 1.67 
Total asset (log) No actions after Media Threat 0.0496 0.69 
Board independence No actions after Media Threat -4.7647*** -11.43 
Institutional ownership No actions after Media Threat -0.6419 -1.45 
Free cash flow No actions after Media Threat -0.1336 -1.17 
Leverage ratio (square root) No actions after Media Threat 0.5805 1.29 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3 – Panel B 
 Hausman Test on IIA Assumption Step Two  
This is the second step in testing IIA assumption with Hausman specification. The second step applies conditional 
logit model based on the sub sample with no nesting which considers 126 cases of Media Threat, among which 71 
are ended without further actions and 55 cases have run into SEC Filing of a proxy fight, after which 26 are ended 
without shareholder voting and 29 are voted eventually. Additionally, 6,207 cases of non-target cases are 
excluded.  
 
Variables Alternatives Coefficient z 
Market adjusted return SEC Filing 0.5738 1.06 
Poison pills SEC Filing -0.4999 -1.26 
Blockholder ownership SEC Filing 1.0979 0.84 
Shareholder proposal (square root) SEC Filing -0.1126 -0.28 
Total asset (log) Voted 0.2616 1.39 
Board independence Voted -0.4052 -0.34 
Institutional ownership Voted -0.1116 -0.09 
Free cash flow Voted -0.0249 -0.27 
Leverage ratio (square root) Voted 0.0052 0.01 
Total asset (log) No actions after Media Threat 0.1370 0.75 
Board independence No actions after Media Threat 1.8810* 1.67 
Institutional ownership No actions after Media Threat -0.7339 -0.61 
Free cash flow No actions after Media Threat -0.3579** -2.10 
Leverage ratio (square root) No actions after Media Threat -0.4258 -0.43 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3 – Panel C 
Hausman Test on IIA Assumption Step Three   
This is the last step in testing IIA assumption. This last step is to calculate (βa - βb)’(Ωa - Ωb)-1 (βa - βb). βa and βb 
are from step one and step two, respectively, and Ωa and Ωb are covariance matrix. (βa - βb)’(Ωa - Ωb)-1 (βa - βb) has 
a chi-square distribution when IIA holds, with two degrees of freedom.  
 
Variables Alternatives 
Coefficients 
fullest (a) 
Subset 
(b) 
Difference 
(a-b) 
Market adjusted return SEC Filing -0.3958 0.5738 -0.9697 
Poison pills SEC Filing -2.1961 -0.4999 -1.6962 
Blockholder ownership SEC Filing -20.6261 1.0979 -21.7239 
Shareholder proposal (square root) SEC Filing -1.9537 -0.1126 -1.8412 
Total asset (log) Voted 0.0097 0.2616 -0.2519 
Board independence Voted -4.5999 -0.4052 -4.1947 
Institutional ownership Voted 1.6977 -0.1116 1.8092 
Free cash flow Voted 0.1305 -0.0249 0.1553 
Leverage ratio (square root) Voted 1.0523 0.0052 1.0471 
Total asset (log) No actions after Media Threat 0.0496 0.1370 -0.0875 
Board independence No actions after Media Threat -4.7647 1.8810 -6.6457 
Institutional ownership No actions after Media Threat -0.6419 -0.7339 0.0920 
Free cash flow No actions after Media Threat -0.1336 -0.3579 0.2244 
Leverage ratio (square root) No actions after Media Threat 0.5805 -0.4258 1.0064 
 
Chi-square = (βa - βb)’(Ωa - Ωb)-1 (βa - βb) =121.76. Prob>chi2 = 0.0000.  
 
Notes: 
1. a = consistent under H0 and Ha obtained from conditional logit model in step 1.   
2. b = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0 obtained from conditional logit model  in step 2.  
3. Null hypothesis is as follows. 
  H0: difference in coefficients is not systematic 
4 Ωa - Ωb is not positive definite. 
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Table 4 – Panel A 
Nested Logistic Regression  
This table shows the direct regression outcome of the nested logit models under Stata10 that are consistent 
with Random Utility Maximization (RUM). The alternatives are as defined in Figure 2. Nothing and No 
further actions after Media Threat are with degenerate nodes and are therefore extended to the bottom level as 
elementary alternatives.  Out of the total of 6,333 firms in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not 
targets of proxy fights and thereby are classified into Nothing group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened 
by activists via media, among which 55 firms (SEC Filing) are threatened further when activists file form 
DEF 14A with the SEC. Only 29 firms end proxy fights via shareholder voting (proxy fight). 
Variables Alternative Coefficient 
Average 
Marginal 
Effects 
Total asset (log) Media Threat -0.1643* -0.0032 
Market adjusted return Media Threat -0.5509* -0.0106 
Free cash flow   Media Threat 0.0785** 0.0015 
Leverage ratio (square root) Media Threat 0.3080 0.0059 
Market to book ratio (log) Media Threat -1.0484*** -0.0202 
Shareholder proposals (square root) Media Threat 0.5966*** 0.0115 
Staggered board No actions after Media Threat 0.1817 0.0012 
Poison pills No actions after Media Threat 2.6244** 0.0198 
Requirement  to approve a merger No actions after Media Threat 0.5419 0.0040 
Requirement  to amend bylaws No actions after Media Threat -0.4679 -0.0029 
Requirement to amend company charter No actions after Media Threat 2.2630 0.0280 
Board independence No actions after Media Threat -28.9569*** -0.1254 
Staggered board SEC Filing -0.8908 -0.0037 
Poison pills SEC Filing -2.1897 -0.0100 
Requirement  to approve a merger SEC Filing -0.9289 -0.0032 
Requirement  to amend bylaws SEC Filing 1.3447 0.0065 
Requirement to amend company charter SEC Filing -3.8977 -0.0083 
Board independence SEC Filing 36.7119*** 0.1468 
Institutional ownership No actions after SEC Filing 0.5389 0.0005 
Number of funds No actions after SEC Filing -0.0011 0.0000 
Insider ownership No actions after SEC Filing 30.3590 0.0306 
Blockholder ownership No actions after SEC Filing -19.9147 -0.0201 
Filing of 13d –active blockholders No actions after SEC Filing 11.8989 0.0766 
Institutional ownership Proxy Fight 0.2603 0.0002 
Number of funds Proxy Fight 0.0041 0.0000 
Insider ownership Proxy Fight -34.8581* -0.0329 
Blockholder ownership Proxy Fight 22.4023 0.0212 
Filing of 13d –active blockholders Proxy Fight -11.3002 -0.0292 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 – Panel B 
Nested Logistic Regression – Dissimilarity Parameters 
This table shows the dissimilarity parameters for the top level and middle level. The table also reports the 
likelihood ratio test result for IIA assumption. The alternatives are defined in Figure 2. Nothing and No further 
actions after Media Threat are with degenerate nodes and are extended to the bottom level as elementary 
alternatives. Their corresponding dissimilarity parameters are defined as 1 (Stata10 manual , 2007).  
 
Level and Alternatives Dissimilarity Parameters  Standard Error 
Top level                 
Nothing (limb1)           1   
Media threat  18.4435 8.9097   
Middle level                                 
Nothing (branch1) 1   
No further actions after Media Threat (branch2)        1   
SEC filing   -71.1981 23.6095 
 
Likelihood ratio test (LR) for IIA (tau = 1): chi2(2) =  87.24       Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Table 5 – Panel A 
Nested Logistic Regression - Robustness Test  
This table shows the direct regression outcome of the nested logit models under Stata10 that are consistent with 
Random Utility Maximization (RUM). The alternatives are defined as shown in Figure 2. Nothing and No further 
actions after Media Threat are with degenerate nodes and are therefore extended to the bottom level as elementary 
alternatives. There are 5,915 firms in TCL in the sample period, 5,798 of them are not targets for Proxy fights. 
117 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists via media, among which 48 firms (SEC Filing) are threatened 
further when activists file form DEF 14A with the SEC. Only 26 firms end proxy fights via shareholder voting 
(proxy fight). Following Thompson, we defined type one, two, three, four and five of institutional investors as 
banks, insurance companies, investment companies, independent investment advisors and others (pension funds, 
etc.). Here, type two is used as the base.  
Variables Alternative Coefficient 
Average 
Marginal 
Effect  
Total asset (log) Media Threat   -0.1781*  -0.0034  
Market adjusted return Media Threat  -0.8574*** -0.0161  
Free cash flow   Media Threat 0.0673 0.0013  
Leverage ratio (square root) Media Threat 0.1653 0.0031  
Market to book ratio (log) Media Threat  -1.1779*** -0.0222  
Shareholder proposals (square root) Media Threat 0.5885** 0.0254  
Staggered board No actions after Media Threat 0.0847 0.0006  
Poison pills No actions after Media Threat 3.3847** 0.0306  
Requirement  to approve a merger No actions after Media Threat 0.7505 0.0060  
Requirement  to amend bylaws No actions after Media Threat -0.3604 -0.0024  
Requirement to amend company charter No actions after Media Threat 1.9174 0.0222  
Board independence No actions after Media Threat   -24.0797***  -0.1649  
Staggered board SEC Filing -0.6192 -0.0021  
Poison pills SEC Filing  -3.5286*  -0.0156  
Requirement  to approve a merger SEC Filing -1.2083 -0.0035  
Requirement  to amend bylaws SEC Filing 1.0548 0.0041  
Requirement to amend company charter SEC Filing -3.5920 -0.0071  
Board independence SEC Filing 48.7247*** 0.1661  
Bank ownership - type 1   No actions after SEC Filing 132.0656 0.0989  
Investment firm ownership - type 3  No actions after SEC Filing 605.2737** 0.4581  
Investment advisor ownership - Type 4  No actions after SEC Filing -49.7794 -0.0371  
Pension ownership - Type 5  No actions after SEC Filing 20.2523 0.0151  
Number of institutional funds - type 1 No actions after SEC Filing 0.5644 0.0004  
Number of institutional funds - type 3 No actions after SEC Filing  -5.9345* -0.0044  
Number of institutional funds - type4 No actions after SEC Filing 0.5700 0.0004  
Number of institutional funds - type 5 No actions after SEC Filing  -0.1234* -0.0001  
Insider ownership No actions after SEC Filing 9.5577 0.0071  
Blockholder ownership No actions after SEC Filing  -26.9762* -0.0201  
Filing of 13d –active blockholders No actions after SEC Filing 0.1847 0.0004  
Bank ownership - type 1   Proxy Fight -114.9183 -0.1077  
Investment firm ownership - type 3  Proxy Fight  -439.094** -0.4082  
Investment advisor ownership - Type 4  Proxy Fight 46.3332 0.0436  
Pension ownership - Type 5  Proxy Fight -18.3565 -0.0173  
Number of institutional funds - type 1 Proxy Fight  -0.7754** -0.0007  
Number of institutional funds - type 3 Proxy Fight 4.2441 0.0040  
Number of institutional funds - type4 Proxy Fight  -0.6214* -0.0006  
Number of institutional funds - type 5 Proxy Fight 0.1684 0.0002  
Insider ownership Proxy Fight -16.1097 -0.0151  
Blockholder ownership Proxy Fight 25.7239 0.0242  
Filing of 13d –active blockholders Proxy Fight 0.0180 0.0000  
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 5 – Panel B 
Nested Logistic Regression Results – Robustness Test II 
This table shows the direct regression outcome of the nested logit models under Stata10 that are consistent with 
Random Utility Maximization (RUM). Herfindahl index is in place of institutional ownership and number of 
funds as in Table IV. The alternatives are as defined in Figure 2. Nothing and No further actions after Media 
Threat are with degenerate nodes and are therefore extended to the bottom level as elementary alternatives.  Out of 
the total of 6,333 firms in TCL in the sample period, 6,207 of them are not targets of proxy fights and thereby are 
classified into Nothing group. 126 firms (Media Threat) are threatened by activists via media, among which 55 
firms (SEC Filing) are threatened further when activists file form DEF 14A with the SEC. Only 29 firms end 
proxy fights via shareholder voting (proxy fight). 
 
Variable Alternative Coefficient Z value 
Total asset (log) Media Threat -0.1971** -2.26 
Market adjusted return Media Threat -0.5422* -1.91 
Free cash flow   Media Threat 0.0797** 2.17 
Leverage ratio (square root) Media Threat 0.2604 0.66 
Market to book ratio (log) Media Threat -1.1146*** -4.08 
Shareholder proposals (square root) Media Threat 0.6136*** 3.01 
Staggered board No actions after Media Threat 0.0621 0.05 
Poison pills No actions after Media Threat -3.3072* -1.82 
Requirement  to approve a merger No actions after Media Threat -0.8057 -0.49 
Requirement  to amend bylaws No actions after Media Threat 0.2170 0.21 
Requirement to amend company charter No actions after Media Threat 4.9107 1.07 
Board independence No actions after Media Threat 6.2036** 2.13 
Staggered board SEC Filing -0.7088 -0.44 
Poison pills SEC Filing 5.3192** 2.28 
Requirement  to approve a merger SEC Filing 1.0202 0.45 
Requirement  to amend bylaws SEC Filing 0.4001 0.30 
Requirement to amend company charter SEC Filing -5.4753 -1.29 
Board independence SEC Filing 0.3331 0.09 
Herfindahl Index (log) No actions after SEC Filing -0.3589 -1.38 
Filing of 13d –active block-holders No actions after SEC Filing 0.8451 0.33 
Insider ownership No actions after SEC Filing -2.6622 -0.59 
Block-holder ownership No actions after SEC Filing -2.0121 -0.38 
Herfindahl Index (log) Proxy Fight -0.2979 -1.16 
Filing of 13d –active block-holders Proxy Fight -0.8308 -0.51 
Insider ownership Proxy Fight -4.1878 -1.60 
Block-holder ownership Proxy Fight 2.7930 0.56 
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Appendix A 
Theoretical Analysis of the Nested Logit Model in the context of Proxy Contests 
In this study, the choice behavior is described by using a random utility (RU) model. 
Additionally, the alternative that is chosen is the one that gives the greatest utility.  
Following Hensheer, Rose and Greene (2005), the scale parameters for each limb, branch 
and elemental alternative in the above nested tree structure are defined as follows.  
Limb: γ(i) 
Branch: λ(j,i) 
Elemental Alternative: μ(j,i) 
Where: 
γ(i) is the scale parameter for the ith limb, λ(j,i) is the scale parameter for the jth branch of 
limb i. Then, μ(j,i)  represents the scale parameter for the elemental alternatives of branch j and 
limb i. It is identical for each alternative present within any given branch, because the variance 
of each elemental alternative present within branch j is equal.  
The utility functions in the higher levels also include IV (inclusive value) which is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the sum of the exponentials of the utility expressions for 
the level directly below which the IV is calculated.  
For simplicity of model presentation, we normalize on μ(j,i) following random utility 
model 1 (RU1). 
Level 1 (elemental alternatives):  
As discussed in Section 2, we focus on variables describing shareholder composition for 
the bottom level:  
1. Aggregated ownership by insiders. 
2. Aggregated ownership by blockholders.  
3. Aggregated ownership by institutional investors.  
4. Number of institutional funds.  
5. The indicator variable for filing of schedule 13-d.  
For the elemental alternatives at Level 1, the utility functions can be expressed as follows.   
Vproxy fight = Va = µ1β1a f (X1a) + µ1β2a f (X2a) + µ1β3a f (X3a) + µ1β4a f (X4a) + µ1β5a f (X5a)   
V No further actions after SEC filing = Vb  
= β0b + µ2β1b f (X1a) + µ2β2b f (X2b) + µ2β3b f (X3b)  + µ2β4b f (X4b) + µ2β5b f (X5b)   
For No further actions after Media Threat and Nothing, utilities are defined at the higher 
level, not at the bottom level. As such, no attributes are included in the utility function at this 
level. Hence,  
VNo further actions after  Media Threat  = Vc = 0.  
Vnothing  = Vd = 0. 
Using RU16 as suggested by Hensher, Ross and Greene (2005), we normalize µ1=µ2= 1, 
hence,  
Va = β1a f (X1a) +β2a f (X2a) + β3a f (X3a)  +β4a f (X4a) + β5a f (X5a)   
Vb = β1b f (X1a) +β2b f (X2b) + β3b f (X3b)  +β4b f (X4b) + β5b f (X5b)   
Vc = 0 
Vd = 0   
Since No further actions after SEC Filing and proxy fight are nested under the branch of 
SEC Filing, the probabilities of the two alternatives are defined as follows.  
                                                 
6 In the RU 1 model the scale parameters are normalized at the bottom of the tree, in contrast to the RU 2 model 
where the scale parameters are normalized at the branch level. 
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π (a, proxy fight) = eva/ (eva+evb)  
= (eβ0a+β1a f(X1a)+β2a f(X2a)+β3a f(X3a)+β4a f(X4a)+β5a f(X5a)) /  
(eβ1bf (X1b)+β2bf(X2b)+β3bf(X3b)+ β4bf(X4b)+β5bf(X5b) + eβ0a+β1a f(X1a)+β2a f(X2a)+β3a f(X3a)+β4a f(X4a)+β5a f(X5a)) 
π (b, No further actions after SEC Filing) = evb / (eva+evb)  
= (eβ0b+β1b f(X1b)+β2b f(X2b)+β3b f(X3b)+β4b f(X4b)+β5b f(X5b)) /  
(eβ1bf (X1b)+β2bf(X2b)+β3bf(X3b)+ β4bf(X4b)+β5bf(X5b) + eβ0a+β1a f(X1a)+β2a f(X2a)+β3a f(X3a)+β4a f(X4a)+β5a f(X5a)) 
Nothing and No further actions after Media Threat are obviously degenerative alternatives. 
Nothing is not partitioned within a branch or a limb. Hence, Prob(d, nothing) = evd / evd  =1. It 
implies that the probability that Nothing will be chosen is not calculated at Level 1, but rather 
at Level 3, the highest level of the tree structure being explored. In comparison, No further 
actions after Media Threat is partitioned within the branch of Media Threat. Still, Prob(c, No 
further actions after Media Threat) = evc / evc =1. However, the probability is calculated at 
Level 2 rather than Level 1.  
Level 2 (Branch):  
We focus on antitakeover measure and board composition for the branch level.  
1. Poison pills position.  
2. Staggered board position.  
3. Super majority requirement on merger.  
4. Super majority requirement on charter.  
5. Super majority requirement on bylaw.  
6. Board independent measure.  
Level 2 consists of three branches.  Branch 2, No further actions after Media Threat and 
Branch 3, SEC Filing, stem from Limb 2, Media Threat. Branch 1 is degenerate with only one 
choice at Level 2.  
The utility of Branch 3 can be expressed as follows.  
VSEC filing =V(1,1)  
= λ(1,1) [β1(1,1) f (X1(1,1)) + β2(1,1) f (X2(1,1))+... + β6(1,1) f (X6(1,1) ) + (1/µ(1,1) )* IV(1,1))]  
Where 
IV(1,1) = ln(e
(µ(1,1)Va) + e(µ(1,1)Vb )).  
Under RU1 which normalize µ(1,1) = µ(2,1) = µ(3,2)  =1,we got the following.  
V(1,1) = λ(1,1) [β1(1,1) f (X1(1,1)) + β2(1,1) f (X2(1,1))+ . . .. + β6(1,1) f (X6(1,1)) + IV(1,1) ]  
Where 
IV(1,1) = ln(e
(µ(1,1)Va) + e(µ(1,1)Vb)  ) = ln(eVa + eVb).  
Va and Vb are known from Level 1.  
For Branch 2, it is assumed that the utility for No further actions after Media Threat is 
defined at this level. Hence, the expected utilities, the IV, from Level 1 is zero.  
Vbranch 2 = V(2,1) = λ(2,1)[β1(2,1) f(X1(2,1)) + β2(2,1) f(X2(2,1)) +…+ β6(2,1) f(X6(2,1) ) + (1/µ(2,1) )* IV(2,1) ]  
= λ(2,1) [β1(2,1) f (X1(2,1)) + β2(2,1) f (X2(2,1))+ . . .. + β6(2,1) f (X6(2,1) )] 
In comparison, Branch 1 linked with Nothing at Level 1 is not defined at this level, but at 
Level 3. Hence, Vbranch 1 or V(3, 2) is still zero.  
Next, similar to the conditional logit model, the probability that a branch is chosen is 
calculated only by considering other branches partitioned within the same limb.  
Hence,  
π(1,1) = eV(1,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1)). 
π(2,1) = eV(2,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1)). 
π(3,2) = 1, since this branch is degenerate.  
Level 3 (limb):  
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Stock performance, prior shareholder proposals and agency costs are the focus of Limb 
Level. We also control for firm size.  
1. Number of shareholder proposals in the prior year.  
2. Market adjusted stock returns.  
3. Industry adjusted log market to book ratio.  
4. Industry adjusted free cash flow.  
5. Industry adjusted square root leverage ratio.  
6. Industry adjusted log firm size.  
There are two limbs stemming from the same trunk. The utility function of Limb 2 
regarding Media Threat with two branches can be written as follows.  
VMedia Threat =V(1) = γ(1) [β1(1) f (X1(1)) + β2(1) f (X2(1))+. . . . + β6(1) f (X6(1) ) +1/λ(1,1) × IV(1)], 
where IV(1) = ln(e
(λ(1,1)V(1,1) + eλ(2,1)V(2,1)) 
Under RU1, the scale parameters at Level 1 are normalized but they are free to vary at 
Level 2. Further, the scale parameters for each connected branch are equal since the IID 
assumption is maintained within each nest.  
So,  
λ(1,1) = λ(2,1) = λ(1) ;  λ(3,2) = λ(2) 
Hence,  
V(1) = γ(1) [β1(1) f (X1(1)) + β2(1) f (X2(1))+. . . . + β6(1) f (X6(1) ) +1/λ(1) × IV(1)], 
where IV(1) = ln(e
(λ(1)V(1,1) + eλ(1)V(2,1)). 
Limb 1 is degenerate and it is assumed that the utility for Nothing is defined at this level. 
Hence, the expected utility, the IV, from Level 2 is zero.  
V(2) = γ(2) [β1(2) f (X1(2)) + β2(1) f (X2(2))+. . . . + β8(1) f (X6(2) ) +1/λ(2) × IV(2)].  
Since, IV(2) = 0, we get V(2) = γ(2) [β1(2) f (X1(2)) + β2(1) f (X2(2))+. . . . + β6(1) f (X8(2) )].  
The probability of the first limb being selected under RU1 is as follows.  
π(1) = eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) ) 
= (γ(1) [β1(1) f (X1(1)) + . . . + β6(1) f (X6(1) ) +1/λ(1) * ln(e(λ(1)V(1,1) + eλ(2)V(2,1))]) / 
(γ(1) [β1(1) f (X1(1)) + . . . +β6(1) f (X6(1) )+1/λ(1)*ln(e(λ(1)V(1,1) + eλ(2)V(2,1))]+ γ(2) [β1(2) f (X1(2)) + 
β2(1) f (X2(2))+. . . . + β6(1) f (X8(2) )] 
Similarly, for Limb 1, its probability is as follows. 
π(2) = eV(2) / (eV(1) + eV(2) ) 
Probability summary: 
The above probabilities calculated in each level are conditional probabilities.  
The following summarizes the conditional probabilities.  
First, conditional on activists’ choices at branch level: 
π(a, proxy fight) = eva/ (eva+evb).  
π(b, No further actions after SEC Filing) = evb/ (eva+evb).  
π(c, No further actions after Media Threat) = 1.  
π(d, Nothing) = 1.  
Second, conditional on activists’ choices at limb level:  
π(1,1) = eV(1,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1)). 
π(2,1) = eV(2,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1)). 
π(3,2) = 1. 
Third, conditional on activists’ choices at top level: 
π(1) = eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) ) 
π(2) = eV(2) / (eV(1) + eV(2) ) 
Next, the direct probabilities for each elemental alternative, each branch and each limb, can 
be calculated as follows.  
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π (a, proxy fight) = (eva/ (eva+evb)) * (eV(1,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1))) *( eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) )) 
π(b, No further actions after SEC Filing) 
=(evb/(eva+evb)*eV(2,1) )/((eV(1,1) + eV(2,1)))*(eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) )) 
π(c, No further actions after Media Threat) = (1* eV(2,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1))) *(eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) )) 
π(d, Nothing) = 1* (1* eV(2) / (eV(1) + eV(2) )) 
π(Branch 3, SEC filing)= (eV(1,1) / (eV(1,1) + eV(2,1)))*(eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) )) 
π(Limb 2, Media Threat) = eV(1) / (eV(1) + eV(2) ) 
To interprete the regression results, we follow Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 2009) to obtain 
Marginal effects (ME), which is the first derivative of the probability functions over an 
independent variable.  
Theoretically, MEn = Marginal effects n = 
p
n, j / ∂Xi (X, γ, λ), 
where, n represents the nth observation, i represents the ith variable of interest and j 
represents the jth elemental alternative in relation to the nth observation.  
Consistent with Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 2009), we use finite difference methods by 
considering an increase of one standard deviation from the sample mean of the variable of 
interest, excluding indicator variables.  
Let x = (z, d), where z is defined as all independent variables other than d. Thus, the 
marginal effects for variable d is as follows.  
MEd = E(y|z=z*, d= D  +σ) – E(y|z=z*, d= D ).  
For the indicator variables, we use the following method to get the ME. 
MEd = E(y|z=z*, d=1) – E(y|z=z*, d=0).  
Following Cameron and Trivede (2005, 2009), for each variable of interest, d, we calculate 
average marginal effects (AME), ME n to explain the regression results of a nested logit 
model.  
ME d =  

N
i 1
ME d,i  / N.  
N is the number of observations and i represents each observation.  
The interpretation of the estimated average marginal effects is that one unit increase in x is 
related to ME% increase in y, while holding all other variables fixed. 
Using AME to explain a nested logit model is straightforward.  Worth noting, however, the 
standard errors are not able to be estimated for AME. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) mentioned 
this issue without any suggestion or solution. Similarly, Jones and Hensher (2007) who aim at 
introducing the nested logit models into accounting research, also fail to offer suggestions on 
this issue. Most important, they use the p values obtained directly from the nested logit models 
in the discussion of the elasticity. In other words, the elasticity (similarly, the marginal effects) 
and the coefficient estimation have the same p values. Thus, we follow Jones and Hensher 
(2007) and Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) and use the p values obtained directly from 
the nested logit models in the discussions of marginal effects in Section 5.  
 39 
Appendix B  
The Functions of the Nested Logit Model 
The coefficients and average marginal effects estimated from the nested logit model are 
reported in Panel A of Table 4. Based on the coefficients, we obtain the estimated utility 
functions and derive the estimated probability functions. They are as follows.  
Utility Functions:  
In general, Unj = Vnj + εnj , where Vnj is observed by the researcher and εnj is a random 
variable whose value is not observable. Additionally, n represents the nth observations and j 
represents the jth alternatives.  
VMedia Threat 
 =18.44 *(-0.16 * TA - 0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage - 1.05 * MTB + 0.60 * 
Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep 
– 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 
* Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d))) 
 
VNo further actions after Media Threat | Media Threat  
= -71.20* (0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep – 0.47 * Bylaw 
+2.26* Charter) 
 
VSEC Filing | Media Threat 
 = -71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * 
Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)) 
 
VNo further actions after SEC Filing | SEC Filing 
= 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 
11.899*filing_13d 
 
Vproxy fight | SEC Filing =   0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* 
fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d 
 
Probability Functions:  
 
π Nothing = 1/(1+ exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * 
MTB +0.60 * Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 
* Boardindep – 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * 
Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
 
π Media Threat  
= exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * MTB +0.60 * 
Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep 
– 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 
* Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
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+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)) 
/ (1+ exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * MTB 
+0.60 * Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * 
Boardindep – 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * 
Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
 
π closed after Media  Threat | Media Threat  
= exp(-71.20* (0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep – 0.47 * 
Bylaw +2.26* Charter) 
/ exp(-71.20* (0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep – 0.47 * 
Bylaw +2.26* Charter)) + exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 
36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
 
π SEC Filing | Media Threat  
= exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * 
Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter + ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 
11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d))) 
 / exp(-71.20* (0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep – 0.47 * 
Bylaw +2.26* Charter)) + exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 
36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
 
π SEC Filing = π Media Threat * π SEC Filing | Media Threat 
= exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * MTB +0.60 * 
Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep 
– 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 
* Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)) 
/ (1+ exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * MTB 
+0.60 * Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * 
Boardindep – 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * 
Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
* exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * 
Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter + ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 
11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d))) 
 / exp(-71.20* (0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep – 0.47 * 
Bylaw +2.26* Charter)) + exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 
36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
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+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
 
π proxy fight |SEC Filing 
= (e 0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)/(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * 
Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d +  
e0.26* institutional+22.40* Blockholder–34.86* Insiders+0.004* fund_no–11.30*filing_13d) 
 
π proxy fight = π Media Threat * π SEC Filing | Media Threat * π proxy fight |SEC Filing 
= exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * MTB +0.60 * 
Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep 
– 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 
* Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)) 
/ (1+ exp(18.44 *(-0.16 * TA -0.55 * HPR + 0.08 * FCF + 0.31 * Leverage – 1.05 * MTB 
+0.60 * Proposal- 1/71.20 * ln(exp(0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * 
Boardindep – 0.47 * Bylaw +2.26* Charter) + exp(-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * 
Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
* exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * 
Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter + ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 
11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d))) 
 / exp(-71.20* (0.18*Stagger + 2.62 *Poison + 0.54 *Merger – 28.96 * Boardindep – 0.47 * 
Bylaw +2.26* Charter)) + exp(-71.20* (-0.89 * Stagger -2.19 * Poison – 0.93 * Merger + 
36.72 * Boardindep + 1.34 * Bylaw – 3.90 * Charter  
+ ln(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * Blockholder + 30.06 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + e 0.26 * institutional + 
22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)))) 
* (e 0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d)/(e 0.54 * institutional – 19.91 * 
Blockholder + 30.36 * Insiders - 0.0011* fund_no + 11.899*filing_13d + 
e 0.26 * institutional + 22.40 * Blockholder – 34.86 * Insiders +0.004* fund_no – 11.30*filing_13d) 
Definition of Variables 
TA: industry adjusted total asset (log). 
HPR: market adjusted holding period returns.  
FCF: industry adjusted free cash flow scaled by total asset.  
Leverage: industry adjusted leverage ratio (square root).  
MTB: industry adjusted market to book ratio (log).  
Proposal: shareholder proposal submittal in prior year (square root).  
Stagger: Indicator variable, staggered board.  
Poison: Indicator variable, poison pills.  
Merger: Indicator variable, super majority requirements to approve a merger.  
Boardindep: board independence level.  
Bylaw: Indicator variable, super majority requirements to amend bylaws. 
Charter: Indicator variable, super majority requirements to amend company charter.  
Institutional: Institutional ownership.  
Blockholder: blockholder ownership.  
Insiders: insider ownership.  
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Fund_no: number of funds 
Filing_13d: indicator variable of active blockholders who file Shedule13-d with the SEC.   
